We present a new construction of anonymous hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) over prime order groups. The distinct feature of our proposed scheme is that both private key and ciphertext have a constant size, which has never been achieved in all other existing anonymous HIBE schemes. Moreover, we utilized a double exponent technique to generate the ciphertext in order to provide anonymity. This simple and efficient method allows us to construct a more compact anonymous HIBE in prime order groups. Under the decisional bilinear n + 1-Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption and linear assumption, we show that the proposed scheme is secure and anonymous against chosen plaintext attacks in the standard model.
INTRODUCTION
In 1984, Shamir [1] introduced the notion of identity-based encryption (IBE). IBE allows a sender to encrypt a message using the recipient's identity as his public key. Hence, IBE does not require to distribute public key certificates as in the traditional public key infrastructure. The first practical and provably secure IBE scheme was given by Boneh and Franklin [2] . To reduce the workload of a single private key generator (PKG), the notion of hierarchical IBE (HIBE) was introduced in [3] . In an HIBE scheme, a root PKG needs only to generate private keys for domain-level PKGs, who in turn generate private keys for users in their domains in the next level [3] . The first construction in [3] was constructed based on random oracles. The first HIBE without random oracles was proposed by Boneh and Boyen [4] . Many efficient HIBE schemes were proposed, such as [5] [6] [7] .
An interesting variant of IBE is called 'anonymous' IBE, where the identity is kept anonymous. In an anonymous IBE scheme, the ciphertext does not leak the identity of the recipient.
The first IBE known to be inherently anonymous was that of Boneh and Franklin [2] . The further application is discussed by Boneh et al. in [8] , where a public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) scheme was proposed. Later, Abdalla et al. [9] formalized it. In PEKS, one can search keywords on encrypted data and the capability for search is delegable. A delegable IBE is called hierarchical IBE (HIBE). Anonymous HIBE schemes provide an approach to extend PEKS to more sophisticated primitives such as public key encryption with temporary keyword search and identity-based encryption with keyword search [9] . In this article, we are interested in anonymous HIBE.
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achieves selective-identity security based on several composite complexity assumptions. Seo et al. [12] also constructed an anonymous HIBE scheme using composite order groups, with constant size ciphertext and linear size private keys. The scheme also achieves selective-identity security without random oracles. Caro et al. [13] and Seo and Cheon [14] proposed two anonymous HIBE schemes in composite order groups, respectively. Both schemes have constant size ciphertext and are adaptive-identity secure without random oracles based on several nonstandard complexity assumptions.
However, prime order groups are more desirable than composite order groups in terms of computational efficiency, because the security of composite order groups relies on a much larger modulus. For example, in RSA, the modulus must be set at least 1024 bits to achieve a basic security level, while to achieve the similar security level in prime order groups, one only needs a 160-bit modulus [15] [16] [17] . As a result, the paring on composite order groups would be slower than the same pairing on comparable prime order groups. It is found that the decryption of HIBE in prime order groups is more efficient than that in composite order groups [16] . Therefore, the most HIBE schemes [12, 14, 16, 18] are constructed in prime order groups.
Our motivations
How to solve the trade-off between the private key size and the ciphertext in (anonymous) HIBE is still a challenge. Let l and k denote the maximum depth and user identity depth, respectively. We noticed that the schemes in [12, 14, 16, 18] give constant size ciphertexts, but private key sizes are 3(l − k + 3) [12] , 3(l − k) + 12 [16] and 6(l − k + 2) [18] , respectively, which rely on the depth of the identity hierarchy. Both private keys and ciphertexs of other anonymous HIBE schemes rely on the depth of identity hierarchy. A natural question is whether there is a method to construct an anonymous HIBE where it has both constant size private keys and constant size ciphertexts. In the general construction, for example, the generation of private key must consider: delegation and rerandomization. They must be set enough parameters to settle the computation of next levels [16] . Abdalla et al. [19] proposed an efficient 'hash function' in their work. Based on this 'hash function', we propose an anonymous HIBE scheme where the ciphertext size, private keys size and the decryption cost are independent of the hierarchy depth.
Our contributions
Our new anonymous HIBE has the following features.
(i) Both private keys and ciphertexts of the new scheme achieve O(1)-size where private keys contain four group elements and ciphertexts consists of five group elements. (ii) Our scheme is also constructed in prime order groups. Security of our system is based on the Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption and decisional linear assumption. It has been used in [5, 20] .
PRELIMINARIES
Symmetric bilinear groups
We briefly review bilinear maps and bilinear map groups. We use the following notation:
(i) G and G 1 are two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order p; (ii) g is a generator of G; (iii) e is a bilinear map e : G × G → G 1 .
The bilinear map e has the following properties:
there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v) for all u, v ∈ G.
Decisional bilinear n + 1-Diffie-Hellman exponent (n + 1-BDHE) assumption
Let g be a generator of group G. The computational (n + 1)-BDHE problem [5] is defined as follows: Given as input a random tuple (g, y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y n , y n+2 , . . . , y 2n+2 ) ∈ G, where
The decisional version of the (n + 1)-BDHE problem in G is defined in the usual manner. Given as input a random tuple (g, y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y n , y n+2 , . . . , y 2n+2 , T), Algorithm B's goal is to output 1 when T = e(g, y 0 ) α n+1 = e(g, g) α n+1 c or 0 otherwise.
HIBE
Following [5] [6] [7] , an HIBE scheme consists of four probabilistic algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt and Decrypt. Note that, for an HIBE of height l (henceforth denoted as l-HIBE), any identity ID is a tuple (v 1 , . . . , v j ) where 1 ≤ j ≤ l. The algorithms are specified as follows:
Setup: On input a security parameter, PKG returns the system parameters together with the master key. These are publicly known while the master key is known only to the PKG. Encrypt: On input ID, the public parameters of the PKG and a message from the message space, it outputs a ciphertext in the ciphertext space.
Decrypt: On input the ciphertext and the private key of the corresponding identity ID, it returns the message or ⊥ if the ciphertext is not valid.
The security model for HIBE
The security model for HIBE is defined as an interactive game between an adversary and a simulator. In the game, the adversary is allowed to query two oracles: decryption oracles and key extraction oracles. We refer to this notion as the selective identity, chosen ciphertext secure HIBE (IND-sID-CCA). More precisely, the game is defined as follows [5] :
The adversary outputs an identity ID * , where it wishes to be challenged.
Setup:
The simulator sets up the HIBE protocol and provides the public parameters to the adversary and keeps the master key to itself. Challenge: Once the adversary decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two equal length plaintexts M 0 , M 1 on which it wishes to be challenged. The simulator picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sets the challenge ciphertext to C = Encrypt(params, ID * , M b ), which is sent to the adversary.
Phase 2:
The adversary issues additional queries q m+1 , . . . , q n where query q i is one of the following: The challenger responds as in Phase 1.
Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} and
We define the advantage of adversary in attacking the scheme as Adv Challenge. Once the adversary decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs plaintext M on which it wishes to be challenged. The simulator picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sets the challenge ciphertext to
Otherwise it sets the challenge ciphertext to C * = Encrypt (params, ID, M ), where ID is a random identity.
Our approach-verifiable random function
Recently, Abdalla et al. [19] proposed a direct method to build a verifiable random functions for constructing IB-KEM scheme. It did not need to resort to the inefficient Goldreich Levin transform. In their construction, a useful function that we can call it 'hash function' was introduced. We found it is also suitable for anonymous HIBE to achieve constant size private keys. It works as follows.
Output: Let ID = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) be a n-bit string representing an identity, where
Finally, output
OUR SCHEME
In this section, we propose an anonymous HIBE scheme that is semantically secure against selective-identity chosen plaintext attacks. This scheme will use double exponent technique [16] . Let G be a group of prime order p and g be a random generator of G. Following [19] , an identity is represented as bit strings of length n. Let l denote the maximum depth of HIBE.
The master key is g α 2 . KeyGen: The keyGen algorithm is given as follows. 
and v ij ∈ {0, 1}, by using the parent (k − 1)th level
) and the corresponding private key
PKG k first picks {α k1 , . . . , α kn , β k1 , . . . , β kn } and generates the auxiliary information parameters as follows: Let
which can be computed by PKG k . Then one can obtain h kn = (h kn ) r 1 and h kn = (h kn ) r 2 . The private key for ID k is generated as 
where r 1 = r 1 + r r 2 , r 2 = r r 2 , r ∈ Z * p . Note: All h in are pubic keys. Encrypt: The encryption of a message M for the identity ID k = (v 1 , . . . , v k ) works as follows. The algorithm chooses random exponents s 1 , s 2 ∈ Z p and generates the ciphertext as:
with the private keys d ID k , the algorithm computes
The correctness can be easily checked:
Efficiency
At any depth, the ciphertext contains only five elements and the decryption requires five pairing operations only. In addition, the size private keys is constant and contain 12 (six for decrypting private key) elements only. In contrast, the previous anonymous HIBE systems [12, 14, 16, 18 ] also have constant size ciphertexts, but the private keys rely on the hierarchy depth where the size of these schemes achieves
[14] and 3(l − k) + 12 [16] . Considering the public keys, our scheme achieves O(k)-size instead of their O(l)-size. Also, note that A = e(g 1 , g 2 ) used for encryption can be precomputed so that encryption does not require any pairings. Table 1 gives a comparison with the previous schemes. In Table 1 , l and k denote the maximum depth and user identity depth, respectively. 
SECURITY
Following [10] , the security proof can be completed by a series of hybrid games. Let (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ) denote the challenge ciphertext given to the adversary during a real attack. The hybrid games are defined as follows.
where R 0 ∈ G 1 and R 1 , R 2 ∈ G. Indistinguishability between Game 1 and Game 2 give the proof of IND-sID-CPA security. Then indistinguishability between Game 2 and Game 3 as well as between Game 3 and Game 4 give the proof of the anonymous feature of the proposed scheme. Proof. The proof follows from the security of the Boneh-Boyen selective-ID scheme [4] and Abdalla's security analysis [19] . Suppose there is an adversary that can distinguish between Games 1 and 2 with advantage ε. Then we build a simulator that plays the decision BDHE game with advantage (1/2 kn )ε.
The simulator receives a D-BDHE challenge tuple (g, y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y n , y n+2 , . . . , y 2n+2 , T) where y i = g α i and T is either T = e(g, g) α n+1 c or a random element of G 1 . The game works as follows:
Init: The adversary announces identity ID
n ) that it wants to attack. Setup: The simulator chooses random exponents t 1 , t 2 , 3 , w = g t and g 2 = y n g γ . The public keys PK are set as PK = (g, g 1 , g 2 , u, v, w, ν, A = e(g 1 , g 2 ) ). ID j = (v 1 , . . . , v j ) , where j denotes the first element such that v j = v * j . Let τ be the number of positions such that v ji = v * ji in v j . To respond this query, the simulator generates the auxiliary information parameters as follows. For 1 ≤ i ≤ j, it computes
The auxiliary information parameters can be computed as follows.
The simulator picks randomly r 1 ∈ Z p and sets r 1 = r 1 − α n−τ +1 /T(v j ). The private keys for ID j are simulated as follows.
They are the perfect simulations. In fact,
In addition,
Then one can obtain
It also creates D ID j . The simulator uses this private key to derive a private key for the descendant identity ID k and gives the adversary the result.
Challenge: When Phase 1 is over, the adversary outputs the challenge message pairs and (M 0 , M 1 ). The simulator first generates the auxiliary information parameters as h in = g T * i for challenge identity ID * , where
The simulator then picks randomly s 1 , s 2 in Z p and responds the ciphertexts as 
Otherwise, T is a random element in G 1 , the simulator is playing Game 2 using (M 1 , ID * ) with the adversary which means b = 1.
Phase 2: The simulator answers the queries in the same way as Phase 1.
Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs b as a guess to b.
Note that from the received inputs, the adversary gets no information about the ID * chosen by the simulator at all, thus such a choice will be identical to the challenge identity with probability 1/2 kn .
The simulator plays Game 1 if and only the given D-n+1-BDHE instance was well formed. Hence the simulator's advantage in the D-n+1-BDHE game is (1/2 kn ) 
that it wants to attack.
Setup: B chooses random exponents
The public keys PK are set as PK = (g, g 1 , g 2 , v, u, w, ν, A = e(g 1 , g 2 ) ).
The master key is set as g
which is unknown to the simulator, where y i = g z i 2 . 
. . .
The simulator picks at random r 1 ∈ Z p and sets
The private keys for ID j is simulated as follows. Note that from the received inputs, the adversary gets no information at all about the ID * chosen by the simulator, thus such a choice will be identical to the challenge identity with probability 1/2 kn .
The simulator plays Game 3 if and only the given augmented D-Linear assumption instance was well formed. Hence the simulator's advantage in the D-Linear assumption game is (1/2 kn )ε.
Based on the above three lemmas, we have the following result.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose D-BDHE problem and the augmented decision linear problems hold. Our scheme is CPA secure and anonymous.
CONCLUSION
In this article, a new anonymous HIBE was introduced based on the Abdalla's 'Hash function'. It achieves constant size of both private keys and ciphertexts, which is a step forward in comparison with the other existing schemes. Our new scheme achieves the selective-identity security which is a weak security for identity-based cryptosystem. In addition, the security is reduced to a strong hardness assumption. It is an open problem to find a scheme which can be proven in a better security assumption.
